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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DAWN W. HORNE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. Case No. 20187 
W. REID HORNE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
May the trial court, pursuant to settlement of an action 
regarding division of marital property, and in order to avoid 
application of newly enacted federal tax law, enter nunc pro 
tunc to the date of the settlement agreement an order of dis-
tribution of property reflecting substantive changes in the 
terms of the agreement? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (Supp. 1983): 
Authority of Court. A court having jurisdiction 
may, upon its finding of good cause and giving of such 
notice as may be ordered, enter an order Nunc Pro Tunc 
in a matter relating to marriage, divorce, legal 
separation or annulment of marriage. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the trial court's entry nunc pro 
tunc of an order of distribution of property incident to a 
previously granted divorce. 
Course of Proceedings 
This is a bifurcated divorce action in which the parties 
were divorced on January 27, 1984, with division of the 
parties1 property reserved for later determination. On 
June 20, 1984, following the first two days of the trial of the 
property aspects of the case, the parties entered into an oral 
property settlement on the record. A dispute arose over the 
tax consequences of the agreement, and on August 17, 1984, the 
district court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, and its Order of Distribution of Real and Personal 
Property, Payment of Debts, Support, Attorney's Fees and Other 
Related Matters in which all reference to taxability had been 
stricken, and in which the court, by interlineation, had made 
substantive changes in other terms of the agreement. Copies of 
those documents are attached in the addendum hereto. 
Disposition in the Court Below 
Over objection of defendant, the court, on August 17, 1984, 
entered its order of property division nunc pro tunc to 
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June 20, 1984 in order to avoid a change in the tax laws which 
became effective July 18, 1984. 
Facts 
This case involves the propriety of entry of an order nunc 
pro tunc for the purposes of avoiding the substantive effect of 
changes in federal tax laws. Plaintiff Dawn W. Home and 
defendant W. Reid Home were marriect on January 17, 1970. (R. 
138.) Plaintiff filed for divorce on February 19, 1980. (R. 
2-3.) The district court ordered the divorce and property 
settlement issues in the proceeding bifurcated. On January 27, 
1984, the parties were divorced. (R. 141-42.) 
Defendant brought substantial premarital property into the 
marriage, ana the parties accumulated substantial property 
during the marriage. The identification of marital property 
was a central issue at trial. Trial of the division of prop-
erty portion of the case began on June 19, 1984 and was 
scheduled to run four days. (R. 185.) On the second day of 
trial, after the plaintiff had testified, the parties reached a 
settlement agreement. The settlement agreement was read into 
the record that afternoon in the presence of the parties, their 
counsel ana the court. (Tr. of Proceedings, June 20, 1984.) 
The settlement agreement, as read into the record, provided 
a method of division of that portion of the parties1 property 
which was agreed to be marital property. (^ Id.) The major 
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terms of the agreement consisted of division of a number of 
parcels of real property. {Id., pp. 2-6.) Other terms of the 
agreement dealt with the division of bank accounts, miscellane-
ous assets, and personal effects. (J[d. , pp. 8-11.) The court 
indicated its approval of the agreement and ordered plaintiff's 
counsel to prepare an appropriate order. (Id_. , p. 12.) 
The subsequent dispute over the terms of the agreement can 
only be understood with reference to federal tax law. Prior to 
July 18, 1984, taxation of marital property settlements 
depended on the terms of the court's order or the parties' 
agreement. In United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), the 
United States Supreme Court held that a transfer of marital 
property incident to divorce was a sale or exchange, and thus a 
taxable event. 370 U.S. at 71. The effect of treating the 
division as a taxable event was to impose upon the transferring 
party (in this case, the defendant) tax liability for capital 
gains on the property up to the date of transfer, and to pro-
vide the recipient party (in this case, the plaintiff) with a 
stepped-up basis in the property reflecting its value as of the 
date of the transfer. See I.R.C. § 1001. 
In several revenue rulings since the Davis case, the Inter-
nal Revenue Service delineated a now well-recognized exception 
to the Davis rule. That exception provided that, if the trans-
action was an attempt to equally divide marital assets, there 
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was no taxable event within the meaning of Davis. See Rev. 
Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26; Rev. Rul. 81-292, 1981-2 C.B. 
158. The theory behind the exception was that, in an approxi-
mately equal division of marital assets, the transaction con-
sisted merely of each spouse retaining his or her own property, 
and thus, there was no sale, exchange or other disposition of 
property to constitute a taxable event. The parties1 dispute 
over the terms to be included in the order in the case at bar 
related to whether the agreement constituted a division of 
marital assets or simply a transfer of property, and thus, 
whether the exception to the Davis rule was applicable. 
Effective as of July 18, 1984, the Tax Reform Act of 1984, 
Pub. L. No. 98-369, did away with the controversy surrounding 
United States v. Davis by overruling the holding in Davis. The 
Tax Reform Act provides that no gain or loss will be recognized 
to the transferor in the case of transfers of property between 
spouses or former spouses incident to a divorce. Further, the 
Act provides that the basis of the property transferred in the 
hands of the transferor spouse will carry over and become the 
basis of the property in the hands of the transferee. Act 
§ 421, adding I.R.C. § 1041 and amending I.R.C. §§ 1015 and 
1239. 
At the settlement conference in the instant case on 
June 20, 1964, the court indicated that it would approve the 
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agreement and requested that Mr. Liapis prepare an appropriate 
order. Mr. Liapis prepared and submitted an order to defen-
dant's counsel for approval as to form. (See R. 218-19.) 
Defendant voiced an objection that the proposed order failed to 
provide that the agreement constituted an attempt to equalize 
the marital assets of the parties, which language would have 
substantially effected the tax consequences of the agreement. 
(See R. 219-20.) While the parties were negotiating over the 
terms of the agreement, the President signed the Tax Reform 
Act, rendering the dispute over the terms of the proposed order 
moot. Because of the change in the tax law, plaintiff moved 
that the order, as proposed by her counsel, be entered nunc pro 
tunc as of June 20, 1984. (R. 218-21.) 
Further, after the entry of the stipulation on the record, 
and during negotiation over the terms of the agreement, a dis-
pute arose between plaintiff and her counsel, in which plain-
tiff alleged various acts of misconduct, including excessive 
billing, sexual harassment and negligence. (See R. 210; Tr. of 
Proceedings, Aug. 8, 1984, pp. 7, 64.) Plaintiff's present 
counsel, Mr. Wade, therefore entered an appearance. (R. 205.) 
A hearing was set on August 8, 1984, to resolve the charges of 
misconduct, the necessary leave of court for appearance of new 
counsel, the dispute over the language to be contained in the 
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SUMMARY Ch ARGUMENT 
I. The nunc pro tunc power is only availa:.*-- t~ c. .* * 
clerical <-<rtoi' M M \ \ 01 a pr -viously made final order; 
it may be usea only to make the rec. ..: . , ^ K U I 1 n i 1 .n n,, not to 
1 r''» "'..Jiirt1,1 tailure to speak. Preece v, Preece, 60J 
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A. The court's oral announcement of its approval of 
the terms of the agreement does not constitute a previously 
made final order such as may be the basis for entry of a later 
order nunc pro tunc. 
B. The dispute over the inclusion or exclusion of 
tax language in the decree was substantive and had not been 
resolved as of June 20, 1984; the court's later ruling regard-
ing the tax issue therefore went beyond mere correction of the 
record of events on June 20, 1984. 
C. The court substantively changed the terms of the 
agreement regarding payment of attorneys' fees; that substan-
tive change demonstrates that the court retained power to alter 
the order and thus that the court's action on June 20, 1984 did 
not constitute a final resolution of the matter in issue. 
II. The court's reliance in this case on the authority 
granted it under Utah Code Ann. § 30-4a-l (supp. 1983) was 
misplaced. 
A. Section 30-4a-l was intended only to permit 
courts to enter nunc pro tunc orders relating to the marital 
status of the parties, and is not applicable to orders involv-
ing only the division of marital property. 
B. Section 30-4a-l does not expand the factual 
circumstances, justifying entry of an order nunc pro tunc; a 
previously made final ruling is still required. 
-8-
C. Sectio:. 3L,--*«-! eq,;ires the couri i i. U"|J^ 
caub- : L nunc or * • * . ,.
 C u ,ii.'s aesire 
> v.-m.' .onjres/ _, udgment r^ :j, ** * lve dates of 
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tin ic in deroga:. • - "jhts. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
UNDER CONTROLLING UTAH CASE LAW, THE LOWER 
COURT'S ENTRY OF THE ORDER NUNC PRO TUNC 
WAS IMPROPER IN THAT THE ORDER INCORPORATED 
SUBSTANTIVE RULINGS MADE AFTER THE COURT'S 
INITIAL APPROVAL OF THE PARTIES' AGREEMENT. 
Preece - , ireec - - <;P2 P. 2d 1. 9 b 'Utai 1984 *.' is ccjrt 
considered the proper application 'u 
i in• 111 d ivorce act ions : 
A motion nunc pro tin ic is used to make the record 
speak the truth; it may not be used to correct the 
court's failure to speak. In other words, the func-
tion of a nunc pro tunc is not to make an order now 
for then, but to enter now for then an order previ-
ously made. 
:^t-^ .-'iv i t it • . Preece, the trial 
*-rL, ju.-.u*i.\j :.._* • ;r :l-i 'ira^ r a decree 
of divorce ana st: fortn tru terms ; , > i.iv.'xuv:-.j 
de.i^ .- : - -• ' ne wxi^'o counsel submitted proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law to the husband's coun-
sel, who in turn asked the court to strike a paragraph awarding 
attorneys' fees to the wife. There was no formal motion madef 
however, and the husband's counsel deferred decision to the 
trial court. Prior to the court's signing of the decree, the 
husband died of a heart attack. In order to establish that the 
wife was not entitled to a portion of the husband's estate, the 
trial court entered the decree nunc pro tunc as of the trial 
date. This court held the lower court's action to be improper 
despite the seemingly harsh result. 
In reaching its conclusion in Preece, this court held that 
the order could only be entered nunc pro tunc to the date of 
trial if there was a final resolution of the matter as of the 
date of trial. The court held nunc pro tunc to be improper, 
reasoning that, until the decree was signed, the trial court 
retained the ability to alter the terms of the decree, which 
indicated that the order was more than a reflection of a 
previously made ruling: 
The determinative factor which prevents the use of 
nunc pro tunc in the instant case is the lack of 
signature on a decree and the attendant ability of the 
court to alter the terms of the decree until it was 
signed and entered. Additionally, the dispute over 
the substantive issue of attorney fees (in spite of 
respondent's counsel's indication that he would leave 
its resolution to the trial court) points to a lack of 
finality. Because the judge's oral announcement was 
not reduced to a signed written decree prior to the 
death of Mr. Preece, a previously made order did not 
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exist and therefore did not afforu 
to emp1oy the nunc pro 11 inc device. 
However, even if the oral announcement were con-
sidered a previous order, nunc pro tunc was misapplied 
here. A nunc pro tunc order should be the reflection 
of a previously made ruling. The court had orally 
announced that the decree was "to become final upon 
signing." By making it effective as of the trial date 
rather than upon signing, the court altered its previ-
ous ruling. It did not merely reflect its previous 
ruling. 
682 P.Zd at ; . 
r
 ' •' factor:; whi:'. ti»*- C R U M : found controlling .• . . *~~ t, 
--;*.., * isc rtt bar, r;J c- mpel the conclur: jn 
that *; jr.: :: r J tu:^ *«... .^isapi . ie i • ]•* *• *• over the 
< — . • ^f .-"! j = i^n of •,;•- language \ he cio;ree u^s substan-
5
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.f that dispute not ' n I y demonstrates tnc 
a * - rHIS uf ih* ienr&r . hut air,? demonstrates that the 
cou: ' ni ,._,t exercis*. ;r^er solely * * nake 
the record speak the tr-jtn, • :t ratliei exeicisec ••» * in 
o t i J *' i - e v i o u n l\' n^^eFol'-pd issue. • l .• - - v^j] t 
" [madej a., u.-ir. n .. : : • • ^L now *~: * hr-"i 
a1"- ^rder i-rev iousl; nwi-.-.1" *.S^ P.-ii .„• t *. ^  . ^  c o m 
c -L Lw avoi 1 s iostar.tive application of 
c cnange in redticu. t^^ law war , * • eversed. 
1
 .:" • - '* «•-' ' . ^ t< rpretation of octn i:ie . i M i n g s 
anu i,i*-_ :- • • ' * •* * J '* r*-*» cjbstant.ve 
cnanges ' ne decree subsequent t, , ,..* 1 • - • , 
- J. I 
the parties' agreement as to payment of attorneys' fees was 
that $20,000 of the $25,000 cash settlement provided in the 
agreement was for attorneys' fees. (R. 245.) Despite the 
parties' agreement that the $20,000 was paid as attorneys' 
fees, the court altered the findings to provide that each party 
was to pay his or her own attorneys' fees. (June 20, 1984 tr. 
p. 11.) 
L. Defendant should be ordered to pay to plain-
tiff, and has done so in open court, the sum of 
$5,000, the same to include the June s-tj^ pe-F* alimony 
payment due under the temporary Order. 
M. Defendant should be ordered to pay to plain-
tiff on or before the second day of July, 1984, the 
sum of $15,000 and an additional sum of $5,000 in six 
(6) months or on or before the 21st day of December, 
19 8 4
 r -a s- -a*ni -&Q-S- -pia-i-fl-kirf-f- -& -a-fe. We-r+e-y- -s- -£^e»& -aftd 
Gos-t-s-. Aft-y- a<i<ii-tio«-a4: Each party is to pay attorneys 
fees and other professional fees incurred by either of 
the parties^ &kauJ^4^-*ts»unia<i^^ 
&wih-GA&t. (R. 271.) 
Plainly, the court made substantive changes to the provision 
regarding attorneys' fees, and such substantive changes also 
preclude the application of nunc pro tunc under the rule 
announced in Preece. 
Finally, no order or judgment was entered on June 20, 
1984. Despite the recitation in the decree that it was to be 
entered "nunc pro tunc to be of record as of June 20, 1984, 
that being the date when the judgment was rendered herein," no 
judgment was in fact rendered on June 20th. Rather, under the 
Preece rule, the oral announcement of the court's approval does 
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not constitj'p ^ rr^"iojs order because of the count's reten-
tion ^ t: - ... . . . ,..-. ,.:,:;: ^ ecisio- 82 
F.2d ,^;> . '- ; ^  ' nuqj^' ' . J<_ J r. " - S 
«iu, ± b (• t * ... • ' • ir- v i i i . o j t l a s ; - . " i i. ' .• c 
c u j r t - ' s e n t r y c : :. ; * o t r e v e r s e s . 
POINT 11 
THE LOWER COURT'S ENTRY OF ITS ORDER OF 
PROPERTY DIVISION NUNC PRO TUNC WENT BEYOND 
THE SCOPE OF ITS STATUTORY AUTHORITY. 
7\ -_-: • • _ t .. order nun^ pro • r 
instant case relied c:\ \:.> r :"»wi: - ; ovison •: * »: w^1', 
enacted in *r : 
court having jurisdiction may, upon u.^ m 
of good cause and giving of such notice as may be 
ordered, enter an order Nunc Pro Tunc in a matter 
relating to marriage/ divorce, legal separation or 
annulment of marriage, 
Utah Code Am.. § 3^ -4,:-~. Uta1 198?) (emphasis adjc 
c " >~ emrhasi^en lino v:^ a: encompassing 
orders u: property . u : i , ; _.- - .j-M^ns. 
The stat 3to AJ^ ^ ~ t , I,OWT ;e: , \t* ndeJ s~w api *y " ^se 
proper^ • -T-rt <*f .- d i v o ^ ^ ^atier, +he legislative 
history of t..f statute aei.ion. :rjt« of 
the legislators that the statute appl v onl J* ^ases , *nich 
the marital stai , •" O *^d, pir- wrier- a 
decree of divorce ; ; rei-me^ out . * ;i ;:. - -3 
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subsequently remarry. As Senator Carling explained the bill to 
the Senate on February 10, 1983: 
Right now, if a court order is entered, the date that 
that order is entered determines all of the procedures 
in the case. In a divorce case, if the papers are 
held up in the clerk's office for some reason and they 
don't get to the judge and are signed on a particular 
date it might create problems in a marriage because if 
the marriage is not final by the time another party 
gets married the second marriage would be void, and it 
might just be because of a clerical mistake. 
In presenting the bill to the House, its sponsor, Rep. 
Lorin Pace, gave several examples of situations to which the 
statute would be applicable. Each of those examples involved 
the marital status of the parties: 
Let me give you two examples. A number of years ago, 
a man and wife obtained a divorce, and after the 
divorce had been obtained, they went back into one of 
the attorneys involved and talked to the attorney 
about setting the divorce decree aside, something 
which can be done by a mere petition within 90 days 
after the entry of most divorce decrees. The attorney 
didn't understand clearly that he was supposed to do 
that, thought that they were still discussing that, so 
he did nothing. And the man and woman went back out 
thinking their divorce had been set aside. Ten years 
later the man died and the woman, in seeking to handle 
the problems of the estate, found out for the last ten 
years she had been living in sin and had not been 
married. Well, upon application to the court, the 
court could enter upon a finding that they had indeed 
thought they were having that divorce decree set 
aside, the court could enter a decree nunc pro tunc 
saying the decree entered today takes effect ten years 
ago and in effect re-establishes the marriage on that 
date. 
Tr. of 3rd Reading of House Bill 218, Jan. 27, 1983, comments 
of Rep. Lorin Pace. 
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case simply backdated its order. The instant case falls out-
side the scope of factual circumstances justifying invocation 
of the nunc pro tunc power and thus, the statutory provision 
regarding nunc pro tunc orders is inapposite. 
Finally, the statute authorizes nunc pro tunc only upon a 
finding of good cause. The district court in the instant case 
found good cause as follows: 
The Court finds that with the recent unexpected 
change in the tax laws that good cause exists to grant 
Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Entry of Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law and Order Nunc Pro Tunc as of 
June 20, 1984. (R. 274 if 5.) 
Regardless of whether the statute otherwise applies, and 
even if the change in the tax laws can be characterized as 
"unexpected" (the Tax Reform Act contained the provision over-
ruling United States v. Davis when first introduced in the 
House on October 20, 1983, s«ee H. R. Rep. No. 98-432, 98th 
Cong., 1st Sess. 191 (1983)), a change in tax laws cannot con-
stitute good cause for entry of an order nunc pro tunc. Under 
this court's ruling in Preece, good cause for nunc pro tunc 
exists only to correct a clerical error or omission, and not to 
make substantive changes in the rights and obligations of the 
parties. 682 P.2d at 299. Further, this court has held that 
the nunc pro tunc device cannot be used to revive the time for 
taking a required step in a legal proceeding after the 
-16-
i elapsed, Kettner v. Snow, 
Utah . : > . 
In t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , the st 2t-;t> r" Mme ^or en try ^* j r^ . ' . r s 
u n c l e 1 | i | i I i ] \\> i - x p i r e d o n u u i \ v; *<-<-. :, < • . e Cv. j r t 
were permittee u- t- , * ; ^iu^rs nunc . . 
subseajon* -^h^ni^- . • • J - _• '*e jOuit woui~* in effect, PC 
perm:* :- " * t oi tne legislature reqar'Hu 
the effective 0.3to * ~ JL enactments. Thn^. th^ r ;• 
i~~ ^ * :*- ' ws cannot, standing alone, con-
h .lutt g.>. cause . * tute. 
POINT III 
EVEN IF ENTRY OF THE ORDER NUNC PRO TUNC WAS 
OTHERWISE PROPER, THE COURT IMPROPERLY 
GRANTED THE NUNC PRO TUNC MOTION IN EXCHANGE 
FOR PLAINTIFF'S ABANDONMENT OF THE CHARGES OF 
MISCONDUCT. 
rtL t: ~ i^rr-'.i •""• August , L'^v4, : •-• ' v**_r r~.:rt consid-
ered sevf . :ie motion ^ er.+^ r the 
order nun.: pro tunc anJ t.v- darje: ^: miser .n., 
plaintii:1 rr r'y ^oun^^l. review • r *!' 1 ; anscript ot mat 
hearina '-:•_.._:...-: _ ^ — entia^lv a^1'^'1 to 
grar- t v ~otion f'^r nun* r! • L.JI. - xenange lor plaini ill 
ahf-i" ' i- JI tne Lii?.r'^ r '^  misr-jnd rt : 
The Court: Let me invite you to just go oui 
the hall with Mrs. Home and discuss what Mr. Gustm 
has suggested as an appropriate solution, to let them 
urge the motion about entry of the order ni inc pro tunc. 
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Mr. Wade: We are willing to do that. We've 
already discussed it and that's exactly what we are 
willing to do. If they win the nunc pro tunc, then we 
have accomplished everything we wanted. If they lose 
the nunc pro tunc, then that's when we want to step in. 
The Court; Is that agreeable, Mrs. Home? 
Mrs. Home: Yes, it is. 
Mr. Crandall: I don't want to get in a position 
where a ruling in favor of the nunc pro tunc is going 
to resolve an otherwise sticky problem. I think 
that's unfair to me because I don't think they're 
entitled to a nunc pro tunc order. 
The Court: We haven't got that far yet. (Aug 8, 
1984 tr. pp. 32-33.) 
While the court later stated that the ruling "was not a 
package deal" (Tr. 34), a fair reading of the entire transcript 
demonstrates that the court in fact traded the nunc pro tunc 
order for abandonment of the misconduct motion: 
The Court: The Court's order will be that I'll 
enter the findings, conclusion and decree without 
regard to any tax language at all, simply a division 
of the assets nunc pro tunc to June 20, 1984. 
Mr. Liapis: Thank you. 
Mr. Gustin: We'll strike the pleading that was 
filed? 
The Court: Do you object to its being stricken? 
Mr. Wade: No objection. It probably hasn't even 
landed in the court's file. 
The Court: Any objection to me turning over the 
original? 
Mr. Wade: No. (Aug. 8, 1984 tr. p. 64.) 
-18-
In appropriate circumstances, a court might well adopt an 
agreement by the parties to grant one motion in exchange for 
settlement of some other pending motion. In the instant case, 
however, the court traded a right of the defendant in exchange 
for a benefit flowing to a third person and not involving a 
claim by the defendant. Such action on the part of the court 
was highly improper and compels reversal of the court's grant-
ing of the motion to enter its order nunc pro tunc. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court's attempt to avoid the substantive 
application of a change in tax law by entry of its decree in 
this case nunc pro tunc was improper. Therefore, that portion 
of the court's order which compels nunc pro tunc application 
must be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~?fc day of December, 1984. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
BY K L W W 
Rodney R. \Pariker 
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ADDENDUM 
1. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
2. Order of Distribution of Real and Personal Property, 
Payment of Debts, Support/ Attorney's Fees and Other Related 
Matters. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH i 
ooOoo 
DAWN W. HORNE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
W. REID HORNE, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. D 80-668 
Judge Rigtrup 
ooOoo 
This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 19th 
and 20th days of June, 1984, before the Honorable Kenneth 
Rigtrup, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, 
Plaintiff, DAWN W. HORNE, appearing in person and by and through 
her attorneys, Paul H. Liapis and Arnold Richer, and Defendant, 
W. REID HORNE, appearing in person and by and through his 
attorney, Richard K. Crandall, and the Court having taken 
testimony and during the second day of trial having been advised 
by counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant that the parties had 
reached a verbal stipulation and agreement, and said agreement 
having been read into the record in the presence of Plaintiff and 
Defendant, and Plaintiff and Defendant having confirmed said 
agreement, and Defendant having agreed to withdraw his pleadings, 
and the Court having already entered the Decree of Divorce on the 
27th day of January, 1984, and the matter having been returned to 
the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Entry of Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and Plaintiff's Motion to 
Compel Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order 
of Distribution Nunc Pro Tunc and the Court having reviewed the 
records and files herein and being fully advised in the premises, 
and upon motion of Paul H. Liapis and Arnold Richer, attorneys 
for Plaintiff, does now make, adopt and find the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff was a bona fide and actual resident of Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, for more than three (3) months 
immediately prior to the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint in this 
matter. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant are husband and wife, having 
been married on January 17, 1970, in Salt Lake City, Utah, and 
having separated in May of 1981. 
3. No children have been born as issue of this marriage, 
and none are expected. 
4. The Court finds that the parties have entered into a 
verbal stipulation and property settlement agreement, which was 
read into the record in the presence of all parties, concerning 
the division of the property of the parties, payment of gi.ipriarr 
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and debts and other related matters, which the Court now finds to 
be fair and equitable: 
A. Plaintiff should be awarded the following parcels 
of real property: 
(1) The Old Farm condominium located at 691 East 
4181 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole and 
separate property, free and clear of any interest of 
the Defendant. Plaintiff should assume and pay the 
mortgage, property taxes and insurance payments 
thereon. 
(2) The duplex located at 1923-25 East 1700 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole and separate 
property, free and clear of any interest of the 
Defendant, together with all appliances, furniture and 
fixtures situated therein and all income received 
therefrom. Plaintiff should assume and pay the 
mortgage, property taxes and insurance payments 
thereon. 
(3) The duplex located at 1935-37 East 1700 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole and separate 
property, free and clear of any interest of the 
Defendant, together with all income, appliances, 
furniture and fixtures situated therein. Plaintiff 
should assume and pay the mortgage, property taxes and 
insurance payments thereon. 
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(4) The Townhouse Court Apartments, containing 
1.18 acres, located at 3160 South 200 East, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, together with all fixtures, appliances, 
current and prepaid rentals, deposits, ledger books, 
financial records, the reserve and escrow accounts, 
M:.., 
a.ng Miii m w uf ?2j647.73 lcpiaBLiiLing the mrani-gG 
mrrriiiiij In hrinnfthr rirrny ^^jwurif mrrrnt , nn shrwi 
<orx>hr» Ml Ml'Tied Prudohfeial'" Fodornl Snv jingo and Loan 
-> yiiliiHj nwixinBTH"Plaiirtt4f £'s Euhibife 1'*, attached 
a^iimnLi i ^ H .uiiPffM .Umnry r; i.U£ ,vr and other items 
directly associated with this property. Plaintiff 
should assume and pay the only mortgage payment upon 
this property to Prudential Federal Savings as of July, 
1984, with a balance of approximately $297,000.00, and 
should assume and pay the property taxes for the year 
1984. Plaintiff should hold the Defendant harmless 
from the mortgage as of July 1, 1984, and all property 
tax obligations for the year 1984. Defendant should be 
responsible for mi& payments on the mortgage for the 
A*. 
months p r i o r t o J u l y 1 , 1984 , i n c l u d i n g r * h**<i jnyl 
l imii t r r l tfij t 1'V- Hay'. fiiT*" " j "i""*1 "M M. 1li '" l , l a t e c h a r g e s } ^ The transfer of this property should be j 
effective July 1, 1984, onti tho above lata chargeg nnrt 
ckii'L fundi; Uhwuld be paid by" th»i: dato« 
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(5) The vacant lot containing 1.52 acres located 
at 6716 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, free and 
clear of any encumbrances thereon. Plaintiff should 
assume and pay the property taxes for the year 1984* 
f^ 'MiiiJ Llm DUfmidauL •ahoul<K^^"^r *n rn*jnHf* rmifriJ-ii" 
nmyrvfeq xndt may ha*a boon c3Lablishcd»for thig 
propcgfeyfr but DiiilunQauL rcpieacrils no mieh aecountgr'»or 
rps^AUiiL "UJ.ibt^ ' 'iElig Guui-4-"lindrf that no mortgage or 
other obligation presently exists on such property. 
B. Defendant should be awarded the following parcels 
of real property: 
(1) The Suzy Q apartment complex located at 644 
South 800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, containing .34 
acre, with a mortgage to Prudential Federal Savings in 
the approximate present balance of $53,300.00, together 
with all fixtures and appliances, rentals, deposits, 
reserves and other such associated assets therein. 
Defendant should assume and pay all mortgages, taxes 
and other debts against said property and hold the 
Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
(2) The 5-plex located at 528 Elm Avenue, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, with no mortgage obligation existing 
against the same, together with all of the fixtures and 
appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and other 
associated assets therein. Defendant should assume and 
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pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against said 
property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
(3) The Townhouse Villa apartment complex located 
at 3570 South 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
containing 2.64 acres of land, with a mortgage balance 
to Prudential Federal Savings of approximately 
$504,709.74, together with all of the fixtures and 
appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and other 
associated assets therein. Defendant should assume and 
pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against said 
property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
(4) The Townhouse II apartment complex located at 
2250 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, with a 
mortgage balance to Prudential Federal Savings of 
approximately $922,687.00, the same being a limited 
partnership with W. Reid H o m e and David H o m e in which 
the Defendant owns 57.5% interest, together with all of 
the fixtures and appliances, rentals, deposits, 
reserves and other associated assets therein. 
Defendant should assume and pay all mortgages, taxes 
and other debts against said property and hold the 
Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
(5) The office warehouse complex located at 547 
West 3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, with a mortgage 
balance to Prudential Federal Savings of approximately 
6 
$199,918.00, together with all of the fixtures and 
appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and other 
associated assets therein. Defendant should assume and 
pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against said 
property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
(6) The rental properties at 62 and 72 Edison 
Street, Murray, Utah, together with all of the fixtures 
and appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and other 
associated assets therein. Defendant should assume and 
pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against -said 
property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
(7) Lot 76, Bloomington Country Club #7, St. 
George, Utah, subject to the Defendant assuming and 
paying any taxes or other obligations owing thereon and 
holding the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
(8) Unit 38 - 414, Snowbird Iron Blossom Time 
Share interest, with the Defendant to assume and pay 
any debts and obligations outstanding and owing against 
said interest and to hold the Plaintiff harmless 
therefrom. 
(9) The two condominiums located at 7833 and 7839 
Honeywood Cove, Salt Lake City, Utah, together with all 
of the fixtures and appliances, rentals, deposits, 
reserves and other associated assets therein. 
Defendant should assume and pay all mortgages, taxes 
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and other debts against said property and hold the 
Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
C. Plaintiff should further be awarded the contract 
receivable for $160,000.00, together with all interest due 
and owing thereon, and the monthly payments of approximately 
$2,000.00 per month, all associated with the Defendant's 
recent sale of the property located at 4400 South State 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. Defendant should cause the 
conveyance to Plaintiff of all right, title and interest in 
and to said contract and contract receivable with said 
conveyance to be effective on the 1st day of July, 1984. 
D. Defendant should be awarded as his sole and 
separate property the furniture, furnishings, fixtures and 
appliances presently in his possession and under his 
control, his bank accounts and savings accounts, the 33,000 
shares of Challenge Corporation stock, and his personal 
effects and belongings, including his grandfather's sword. 
E. Plaintiff should be awarded as her sole and 
separate property all the furniture, furnishings, fixtures 
and appliances presently in her possession and under her 
control, the 1981 Toyota Cressida automobile, her bank 
accounts and savings accounts and other such accounts, and 
her personal effects and belongings. 
F. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant should be awarded 
any alimony from the other. 
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G. Defendant should be ordered and required to secure 
and maintain at normal and reasonable rates a $100,000.00 
term life insurance policy on his life, with the Plaintiff 
as owner and with the Plaintiff named as primary, sole and 
exclusive beneficiary thereon. Defendant should forthwith 
obtain said policy in the name of Plaintiff, deliver said 
policy to her and make all premium payments thereon. 
H. Plaintiff should be required to assume and pay and 
hold the Defendant harmless therefrom the following 
obligations: The only mortgage payment on the Townhouse 
Court Apartments to Prudential Federal Savings, the mortgage 
payment on Plaintiff's condominium to Prudential Federal 
Savings, the mortgage payment on the two duplexes awarded 
Plaintiff to MountainWest Savings and Loan, the property 
taxes on the above condominium, duplexes, Townhouse Court 
and lot at 6716 South 1300 East, all in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, and any debts she has incurred in her own 
name since the filing of the Complaint in this matter,-ov r«W^^-
I. Defendant should be required to assume and pay and 
hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom the following 
obligations: All debts and obligations incurred by the 
parties during the course of the marriage/, all debts 
associated with those real properties awarded to the 
Defendant, all obligations that may result from joint tax 
return filings of the parties, and 'any debts and obligations 
9 
he has incurred in his own name since the filing of the 
Complaint in this matter. 
a registered nurse with St. Mark's Hospital and hao an 
inQfiwifi of bct»**n ?7'iftB00 and ?8QQiQQ not peg moMih and a loo 
has rental income from her two duplexes. 
K. 'EtocuajuiL Lumlb that* the Defendant is 
self-employed fry WrR.H-i Con&trucfciew Cuiupdiiy; 1 
majority o*ogkholdari and has rental income from the various 
apartment complexes referred to above. 
L. Defendant should be ordered to pay to Plaintiff, 
and has done so in open Court, the sum of $5,000.00, the 
same to include the June aj*fudta*<t payment due under the 
Temporary Order. 
M. Defendant should be ordered to pay to Plaintiff on 
or before the 2nd day of July, 1984, the sum of $15,000.00 
and an additional sum of $5,000.00 in six (6) months or on 
or before the 21st day of December, 1984, JLJ iwfd f §i 
S«L£ fink A> *fZ <p*£ MtZ+fy fa*« c» 
P3.aiuLirf' J uLfeornoy'r foog nnri rnefcoy ftriy* additional- fees &h 
incurred by either of the parties, ohouicl be1 
jqrfXuAftf*11 i i in j i in 11 
N. Defendant should cooperate in obtaining a Toyota 
automobile or automobiles for Plaintiff at the dealer's 
wholesale price through the automobile dealerships owned by 
Larry H. Miller. The CourL finda that Plaintiff should have 
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the privilege of purchasing new automobiles at the dealer's 
t't'u 
wholesale price for as long a period of time as Defendant 
has this privilege,! Tha geii^ finds feha* teho doalsir 
whn 1 ii r n \ in \\ r i r u in n n ¥ Hi n 1 p i i *m n r f r i y il in 1 h r j t ? t iti 1 
p u h l i i r , b u t in r n t h r r t h r r l m l o r ' r f n r t n r y r p g t , 
O. Tho Cour t fmrfrlin flinJlj tihrtL S h o u l d De fendan t e v e r 
o b t a i n any o w n e r s h i p o r p r o p r i e t a r y i n t e r e s t i n any of t h e 
e n t i t i e s t h a t D e f e n d a n t s o l d t o L a r r y H. M i l l e r i n November 
of 1 9 8 1 , t h e n P l a i n t i f f s h o u l d a u t o m a t i c a l l y be awarded 
o n e - h a l f of t h e D e f e n d a n t ' s a c q u i r e d i n t e r e s t . 
K
 Liu.juiiari-- a t " t h a t Li.uu a r c kuuuun u i wuie known 
Tnyfitnl Tmp^rt f Tn~ ,—Lafllliai C l l u I i m u r a n c e Company-, Ed 
^ r r a l h u r n T ^ y ^ t a , Til"1 . n,mlriini n f Mnvrny.—faai'vy M i l l e r ' s 
Woitftiiifl Tn rn tn • (LriTiry Mil l i i Tiijiil.i iif r i i u i n l " ) , hnrnllin 
«ftgoooiatcD, Lawduai Haiidyunmirt, LdiidCcii Ayuin.y, ChiJ»lun 
MnfrQirg, L t d . , Lancioau Luagjliy , "Limitedy* and L d i i y - M i l i i t r 
P. Defendant should be ordered to replace the roof on 
the duplex at 1933-37 East 1700 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
at his sole cost and expense. Said work is to be done by 
the Defendant's work crew and at the sole cost of the 
Defendant and is to be completed within sixty (60) days of 
the signing of this order. 
Q. The parties should each be mutually enjoined and 
restrained from harassing, annoying, bothering or harming 
11 
one another in any way and at any time, with the sole 
exception that they are allowed to contact one another to 
complete the requirements and the transfer of properties, 
payment of debts, repairs and other items as made necessary 
by this order. 
R. Defendant should be awarded all right, title and 
interest he holds in and to the W.R.H. Construction Company, 
together with all assets and liabilities associated 
therewith, with the same to be free and clear of any 
interest of the Plaintiff. 
S. Defendant should further be granted a right of 
first refusal should the Plaintiff ever place any of the 
above properties, excluding the Old Farm condominium, 
awarded to her for sale, with said right to be exercised in 
writing within three (3) business days of receipt of the 
offer of purchase from the Plaintiff's prospective buyers. 
T. The parties should each be ordered to do and 
perform all the matters and things required by each of them 
to be done herein, and they should effectuate and carry 
forth the agreement expressed herein. 
U. The parties further agree that all property, 
assets and other items which have been acquired during this 
marriage have been fully declared and distributed by this 
Agreement and that no other assets or properties exist. 
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5. The Court finds that with the recent unexpected change 
in the tax laws that good cause exists to grant Plaintiff's 
Motion to Compel Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Order Nunc Pro Tunc as of June 20, 1984. The court further 
finds that the Defendant was given proper notice of such Motion. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and 
adopts its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The verbal stipulation and property settlement 
agreement presented to the Court and more fully reflected in the 
foregoing Findings of Fact, concerning division of the property 
of the parties, payment of support, payment of the debts and 
obligations of the parties, and other matters, as more 
specifically set forth above, should be ratified, approved and 
confirmed in all particulars, and the same is to be embodied into 
the Order of Distribution of Real and Personal Property, Payment 
of Debts, Support, Attorney's Fees and Other Related Matters to 
be entered herein. 
2. It is hereby ordered that the final judgment of divorce 
which has this day been signed by the Court be filed and entered 
Nunc Pro Tunc to be of record as of June 20, 1984, that being the 
date when the judgment could have been signed, dated, filed and 
entered. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
That judgment be entered accordingly. 
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DATED this f0 "day of August, 1984. 
BY THE COURT 
tENHETH RIGTRl 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
RICHARD K. CRANDALL 
Attorney for Defendant 
N. D/XQA?';.; 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY 
This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was hand-
delivered to Richard K. Crandall, Esq., 10 Exchange Place, 11th 
Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110, this /£) ""day of August, 
1984. 
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PAUL H. LIAPIS 
ARNOLD RICHER 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Third Floor, New York Building 
48 Post Office Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: 532-6996 
AUG 17 ?984 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
DAWN W. HORNE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
W. REID HORNE, 
Defendant. 
ORDER OF DISTRIBUTION OF 
REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY, 
PAYMENT OF DEBTS, SUPPORT, 
ATTORNEY'S FEES AND OTHER 
RELATED MATTERS 
Civil No. D 80-668 
Judge Rigtrup 
ooOoo 
This matter having come on regularly for trial on the 19th 
and 20th days of June, 1984, before the Honorable Kenneth 
Rigtrup, one of the Judges of the above-entitled Court, 
Plaintiff, DAWN W. HORNE, appearing in person and by and through 
her attorneys, Paul H. Liapis and Arnold Richer, and Defendant, 
W. REID HORNE, appearing in person and by and through his 
attorney, Richard K. Crandall, and the Court having taken 
testimony and during the second day of trial having been advised 
by counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant that the parties had 
reached a verbal stipulation and agreement, and said agreement 
having been read into the record in the -presence of Plaintiff and 
Defendant, and Plaintiff and Defendant having confirmed said 
agreement, and Defendant having agreed to withdraw his pleadings, 
and the Court having already entered the Decree of Divorce on the 
27th day of January, 1984, and the matter having been returned to 
the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel Entry of Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order and Plaintiff's Motion to 
Compel Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order 
of Distribution Nunc Pro Tunc, and the Court having made and 
entered herein its written Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, and upon motion of Paul H. Liapis and Arnold Richer of 
GUSTIN, ADAMS, KASTING & LIAPIS, attorneys for Plaintiff: 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED 
as follows: 
1. Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded the following 
parcels of real property: 
A, The Old Farm condominium located at 691 East 4181 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole and separate 
property, free and clear of any interest of the Defendant. 
Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay the mortgage, 
property taxes and insurance payments thereon. 
B. The duplex located at 1923-25 East 1700 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole and separate property, 
free and clear of any interest of the Defendant, together 
with all appliances, furniture and fixtures situated therein 
and all income received therefrom. Plaintiff is ordered to 
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assume and pay the mortgage, property taxes and insurance 
payments thereon. 
C. The duplex located at 1935-37 East 1700 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, as her sole and separate property, 
free and clear of any interest of the Defendant, together 
with all appliances, furniture and fixtures situated therein 
and all income received therefrom. Plaintiff is ordered to 
assume and pay all mortgage, property taxes and insurance 
payments thereon. 
D. The Townhouse Court Apartments, containing 1.18 
acres, located at 3160 South 200 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
together with all fixtures, appliances, current and prepaid 
rentals, deposits, ledger books, financial records, the 
reserve and escrow accounts, tn-lnflinj Ih mm nf f?,fifli7i7fl 
y n p r n p i n l i n j MM n i i n r r r w nnnnrr-Mry + <^ fori^fj +hC CTnW 
i i r i f i n m l ffMrrrntj an n l m w n MM M M . i f f H l i i n l P i m l i n l i ii 1 r r d r r n l 
SITHTHJT vr"* T ' ' ^ " ' j ] 1 " n 1 " i M i r r ' n 1 P i ' n fl 
atliiaqheeU&cPfaib^ aiidMiuifle-n ydJ&£»-htiL\du£ by^-»frforQiifce.| gay 
^fhQ,C ^'" l n ' ' *Mtwi11 *»*«< > j " " Tj—" y 1 | innd.( and o t h e r 
items directly associated with this property. Plaintiff is 
ordered to assume and pay the only mortgage payment against 
said property to Prudential Federal Savings on said 
property, commencing July, 1984, with a balance of 
approximately $297,000.00, and shall assume and pay the 
property taxes for the year 1984. Defendant shall be 
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responsible for -«*t payments on the mortgage for the months 
prior to July, 1984, including, but mot Aimifeod fee-, Lhe May, 
t-982 and KtHr^kr- I?9», late charges,7 The transfer of this # ^ 
property shall be effective July 1, 1984
 # and the nbjsiwc lata 
^ih^rfl^ nnri XC i n fin! • 1 • • 111 1 [ ul lij^ thmtjpfU.ta 
E. The vacant lot containing 1.52 acres located at 
6716 South 1300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, free and clear 
of any encumbrances thereon. Plaintiff is ordered to assume 
and pay the property taxes for the year 1984, and ithe 
r^^nflnnt h^nlil transfer fr,n PI rrint i f f ,my tnn rmrrvri that 
may have b*yu-.ea£tab3 ishpd for this-psopertyj tout Defendant 
rcprep^nWOi no suih-aicuuirfes on1 roGorvca cxtal. 
2. Defendant be and he is hereby awarded the following 
parcels of real property: 
A. The Suzy Q apartment complex located at 644 South 
800 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, containing .34 acre, with a 
mortgage to Prudential Federal Savings in the approximate 
present balance of $53,300.00, together with all fixtures 
and appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and other such 
associated assets therein. Defendant is ordered to assume 
and pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against said 
property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
B. The 5-plex located at 528 Elm Avenue, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, with no mortgage obligation existing against the 
same, together with all of the fixtures and appliances, 
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rentals, deposits, reserves and other associated assets 
therein. Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all 
mortgages, taxes and other debts against said property and 
hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
C. The Townhouse Villa apartment complex located at 
3570 South 300 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, containing 2.64 
acres of land, with a mortgage balance to Prudential Federal 
Savings of approximately $504,709.74, together with all of 
the fixtures and appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and 
other associated assets therein. Defendant is ordered to 
assume and pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against 
said property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
D. The Townhouse II apartment complex located at 2250 
South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah, with a mortgage 
balance to Prudential Federal Savings of approximately 
$922,687.00, the same being a limited partnership with W. 
Reid Home and David Home in which the Defendant owns 57.5% 
interest, together with all of the fixtures and appliances, 
rentals, deposits, reserves and other associated assets 
therein. Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all 
mortgages, taxes and other debts against said property and 
hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
E. The office warehouse complex located at 547 West 
3900 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, with a mortgage balance to 
Prudential Federal Savings of approximately $199,918.00, 
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together with all of the fixtures and appliances, rentals, 
deposits, reserves and other associated assets therein. 
Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all mortgages, taxes 
and other debts against said property and hold the Plaintiff 
harmless therefrom. 
F. The rental properties at 62 and 72 Edison Street, 
Murray, Utah, together with all of the fixtures and 
appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and other associated 
assets therein. Defendant is ordered to assume and pay all 
mortgages, taxes and other debts against said property and 
hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
G. Lot 76, Bloomington Country Club #7, St. George, 
Utah, subject to the Defendant assuming and paying any taxes 
or other obligations owing thereon and holding the Plaintiff 
harmless therefrom. 
H. Unit 38 - 414, Snowbird Iron Blossom Time Share 
interest, with the Defendant to assume and pay any debts and 
obligations outstanding and owing against said interest. 
I. The two condominiums located at 7833 and 7839 
Honeywood Cove, Salt Lake City, Utah, together with all of 
the fixtures and appliances, rentals, deposits, reserves and 
other associated assets therein. Defendant is ordered to 
assume and pay all mortgages, taxes and other debts against 
said property and hold the Plaintiff harmless therefrom. 
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3. Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded the contract 
receivable for $160,000.00, together with all interest due and 
owing thereon, and the monthly payments of approximately 
$2,000.00 per month, all associated with the Defendant's recent 
sale of the property located at 4400 South State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah. Defendant be and he is further ordered to cause 
the conveyance to Plaintiff of all right, title and interest in 
and to said contract and contract receivable, with said 
conveyance to be effective on the 1st day of July, 1984. 
4. Defendant be and he is hereby awarded as his sole and 
separate property the furniture, furnishings, fixtures and 
appliances presently in his possession and under his control, his 
bank accounts and savings accounts, the 33,000 shares of 
Challenge Corporation stock, and his personal effects and 
belongings, including his grandfather's sword. 
5. Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded as her sole and 
separate property all the furniture, furnishings, fixtures and 
appliances presently in her possession and under her control, the 
1981 Toyota Cressida automobile, her bank accounts and savings 
accounts, and her personal effects and belongings. 
6. Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant is awarded any alimony 
from the other. 
7. Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to secure and 
maintain at normal and reasonable rates a $100,000.00 term life 
insurance policy on his life, with the'Plaintiff as owner and 
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with the Plaintiff named as primary, sole and exclusive 
beneficiary thereon. Defendant is ordered to forthwith obtain 
said policy in the name of Plaintiff, deliver said policy to her 
and make all premium payments thereon. 
8. Plaintiff be and she is hereby ordered to assume and 
hold Defendant harmless therefrom the following obligations: 
The only mortgage payment on the Townhouse Court Apartments to 
Prudential Federal Savings, the mortgage payment on Plaintiff's 
condominium to Prudential Federal Savings, the mortgage payment 
on the two duplexes awarded Plaintiff to MountainWest Savings and 
Loan, the property taxes on the above condominium, duplexes, 
Townhouse Court and lot at 6716 South 1300 East, all in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, and any debts she has incurred in her own 
name since the filing of the Complaint in this matter^r^i (fnK^cUi 2/? 
9. Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to assume and 
hold Plaintiff harmless therefrom the following obligations: All 
debts and obligations incurred by the parties during the course 
of the marriage/, all debts associated with those real properties 
awarded to the Defendant, all obligations that may result from 
joint tax return filings of the parties, and any debts and 
obligations he has incurred in his own name since the filing of 
the Complaint in this matter. 
10. Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to pay to 
Plaintiff on or before the 2nd day of July, 1984, the sum of 
$15,000.00 and an additional sum of $5,0^ 00.00 in six (6) months 
8 
o r on o r b e f o r e t h e 2 1 s t day of December, 1984# tto and < o r 
tf 
P l w i r^i f f,f n n ^ n ^ i y t n f n n o fiftd P f r j ^ M j U U i Q i L i U l l d l f * X o 
incurred oy either of the parties* shall- bo QOOumecL by the -party 
occurring auclT1 \IVE>L. 
11. Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to cooperate in 
obtaining a Toyota automobile or automobiles for Plaintiff at the 
dealer's wholesale price through the automobile dealerships owned 
by Larry H. Miller. The Plaintiff shall have the privilege of 
purchasing new automobiles at the dealer's wholesale price for as 
long a period of time as Defendant has this privileged The Oeurt f&*&£ 
ukdorafcandc—Ili.il Hi' 1 ii1"f wlml rinrilr [i ii i nnl.thnt pyjrr 
offrrnr^ to Lke luldil public, buL ii> guLbii the'fl5&l^i^»-#aets<^cy 
12. Should Defendant ever obtain any ownership or 
proprietary interest in any of the entities that Defendant sold 
to Larry H. Miller in November of 1981, then Plaintiff be and is 
hereby awarded one-half of the Defendant's acquired interest 
immediately upon receipt. The rn1 i(.irBi iii'ijuiind nt thnt tTmn. ^ ^" 
£ ' 
T f n o ^ ^ I n c . , LctluiL'cii L i f e 
•^ rn IIj mi ifi  irnmpHny >—Dd &*bi!lb'UrTr-Toyutd ,—Inc. ,—Dubam o f ' M u i f a y , 
J iT i r ^p^^ r u : i ^ v " 1 n T i ] n r , * " ' i n rp^y^^r—(T.i11 I ji Mi 11 o r Tnyn tn J_I f Plini n i ih) j 
T i r i l fMig Anr rn in !— r s PinrHTrir Hrmrrfrnir n t , TJrTiiHnr" ft'flrm j ' , H i H T ^ m 
JIQLotfcr L t a r T T ^ n d ^ c i i ^ienfeln^ y LimiBLceh and L d i i y M i l l r f Tunisia 
l r f Sril I . 
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13. Defendant be and he is hereby ordered to replace the 
roof on the duplex at 1933-37 East 1700 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, at his sole cost and expense. Said work is to be done by 
the Defendant's work crew and at the sole cost of the Defendant 
and is to be completed within sixty (60) days from the signing of 
this order. 
14. Defendant be and he is hereby awarded all right, title 
and interest he holds in and to the W.R.H. Construction Company, 
together with all assets and liabilities associated therewith, 
with the same to be free and clear of any interest of the 
Plaintiff. 
15. Defendant be and he is hereby granted a right of first 
refusal should the Plaintiff ever place any of the above 
properties, excluding the Old Farm condominium, awarded to her 
for sale, with said right to be exercised in writing within three 
(3) business days of receipt of the offer of purchase from the 
Plaintiff's prospective buyers. 
16. The parties be and they are each hereby restrained and 
enjoined from harassing, annoying, bothering, or otherwise 
harming one another in any way and at any time, with the sole 
exception that they are allowed to contact one another to 
complete the requirements and the transfer of properties, payment 
of debts, repairs and other items as made necessary by this 
order. 
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17. The verbal stipulation and property settlement 
agreement of the parties is hereby approved and confirmed in all 
particulars. 
18. It is hereby ordered that this Order of Distribution of 
Real and Personal Property, Payment of Debts, Support, Attorney's 
Fees and Other Related Matters which has this day been signed by 
the Court be filed and entered Nunc Pro Tunc to be of record as 
of June 20, 1984, that being the date when the judgment was 
rendered herein. 
19. The parties be and they are each hereby ordered to do 
and perform all the matters and things required by each of them 
to be done herein, 
DATED AND SIGNED this f? —flay of August, 1984 and to be 
filed and entered Nunc Pro Tunc as of June 20, 1984 that being 
the day the judgment could have been signed, dated, filed and 
entered. 
BY/TH# COURT: 
?H RIGTRUP 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: i i 
B 
RICHARD K. CRANDALL 
Attorney for Defendant 
H. DIXON 5-JW(>:-EY 
li 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that four true and correct copies of the forego-
ing Brief of Appellant were served on Douglas B. Wade, attorney 
for respondent, Suite 900 No. 4, Valley Tower Building, 50 West 
Broadway, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, by hand delivery, on 
December "Vk * 1984. 
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